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One of the major implications of the Rose Revolution in Georgia has been its inclusion, 
together with Armenia and Azerbaijan, into the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 
Raised expectations about the success of democracy in Georgia and its possible 
spillover effect on the neighbourhood in the wider region have largely determined this 
decision on the part of the European policy community. This, in turn, has galvanised 
Georgian policy community and public opinion with hopes about the increased 
prospects for Georgia’s integration in the EU. In addition, it is expected that in the 
shorter run the ENP will provide a basis for the EU’s active involvement in the process 
of conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other hand, Brussels views 
the ENP as a powerful resource for Georgia to modernise through genuine 
democratisation and effective market-based reforms. 
This paper attempts to provide an analysis of Georgia’s Europeanization prospects 
within the context of the ENP. The purpose of this analysis is to help formulate a 
coherent vision of Georgia’s future role and place in enlarging Europe. Primary 
research questions investigated relate to: (a) the compliance of the ENP’s objectives 
and instruments with Georgia’s developmental needs; (b) conditionalities of the EU’s 
more active participation in solving Georgia’s outstanding security problems; the main 
hypothesis that is being tested is as follows: Georgia’s participation in the ENP is 
viewed differently in Brussels and Tbilisi and the divergence of interpretations of this 
process challenges the ENP’s objectives vis-à-vis Georgia. The paper puts forth the 
argument that both the Georgian Government and the Commission lack adequate 
  
capacities to effectively handle the ENP process. There are certain constraints on both 
sides driven by internal and external factors that may complicate the process of 
negotiations on the ENP Action Plan. The partners may also need to learn more about 
the availability of each other’s resources so as to apply adequate strategies to reconcile 
their divergent perceptions. The paper analyses and assesses various policy options 
and concludes by offering a number of policy recommendations aimed at assisting 
policymakers both in Brussels and Tbilisi as they work out strategies for maximizing the 
benefits from Georgia’s rapprochement with Europe. 
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“I am Georgian and, therefore, I am European” 
Zurab Zhvania 
1 Introduction 
Georgia’s inclusion in the ENP has put the country in a new ‘Wider Europe’ context 
which still needs to be shaped. This context, however, is already given different 
readings in Brussels and Tbilisi. On the one hand, the EU policy planners view the 
future Georgia in the Wider Europe as a modernized country and effective partner, 
having both a developed democracy and a market economy. In the long run, however—
in case Georgia’s participation in the ENP is successful—Brussels, at least for the time 
being, does not guarantee Georgia’s accession to the EU. On the other hand, EU 
accession is a national project for Georgia. Institutional integration into the EU has long 
become a major long-term foreign policy priority and a matter of societal consensus. 
For this reason Georgia’s inclusion in the ENP is falsely viewed in Tbilisi as an indirect 
signal of its eligibility for eventual EU membership. Further, what is also expected is the 
EU’s increased role as a foreign and security policy actor through the ENP. Because of 
the application of the ENP, Georgians expect a far more active role of the EU in conflict 
resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, 
Tbilisi supposes that the negotiations on the Action Plan will be ‘a process on equal 
footing’ whereby Georgia succeeds in promoting most of its views and carrying its point. 
These divergent interpretations and excessive expectations are fraught with 
consequences for both Brussels and Tbilisi. First, a consistently negative message on 
EU membership for Georgia will diminish any leverage the EU has on promoting 
democratic reform. This is particularly important at this moment as the new Georgian 
government has set itself the goal to push through reforms that do not necessarily imply 
popular decisions. At some juncture, as the possibility of the EU accession remains 
unclear, the government will lose public support leading to stalling the reforms. Second, 
in case the EU fails to engage in the process of resolving Georgia's outstanding 
security problems, the ENP’s credibility will suffer significantly. This disillusionment may 
diffuse elsewhere in the region as well. Third, Georgia’s misinterpretation of the ENP’s 
substance and objectives may be misleading in identifying and/or negotiating priorities 
and activities for the Action Plan. A defective Action Plan will negatively affect the 
second phase of the ENP, which starts in 2007 and will be implemented through the 
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major assistance programmes within the European Neighborhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI). 
The ambiguities of Georgia’s role and prospects in the Wider Europe, therefore, 
need to be eliminated from the outset. This paper intends to help bridge the existing 
gap between the different interpretations in Brussels and Tbilisi through formulating 
policy recommendations based on the study of the following issues: 
• General EU-awareness and administrative capacity of Georgian government to 
effectively handle the ENP process. 
• ENP as an avenue to the EU’s increased engagement in Georgia. 
• Geopolitical context of EU’s evolution as a full-fledged foreign and security policy 
actor in Georgia. 
Each of the above is a factor of Georgia’s approximation to the EU. These factors 
are different by nature but their interplay weaves a fabric of the EU-Georgia relations. 
2 Georgia’s European Choice 
Georgia’s European vocation is a complex phenomenon. It is rooted both in the 
history and the spirituality of Georgians. For the purposes of this study, however, a 
retrospective analysis is avoided and consideration is given to the factors that 
determine modern Georgia’s drive towards Europe. As this chapter seeks to evaluate 
the sustainability of Georgia’s European orientation, special emphasis will be put on 
foreign policy, government’s institutional capacity and the effectiveness of policy tools, 
such as PCA and ENP. 
2.1 Foreign Policy Orientation 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Georgia was able to formulate its own foreign 
policy with a pro-Western orientation. This approach included: 
• Seeking Western mediation of the conflicts in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia; 
• Courting Western investment; 
• Seeking Georgia’s participation in European and Euro-Atlantic security structures; 
• Promoting Georgia as a transit country for commerce between the West and the 
states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus; 
• Seeking direct political, economic, and security ties with the United States. 
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Georgia’s strategic choice is primarily based on the ‘fear of Russia’ paradigm.1 
This is a security-driven motivation. Over the past two centuries, the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union have contributed much to laying the foundation of current ethnic 
tensions in Georgia through the deportations and resettlement of different ethnic 
groups, as well as artificially drawing and redrawing administrative boundaries. 
Since the breakup of the USSR, Moscow has shown little willingness to witness the 
emergence of Georgia as a sovereign state capable of making free choices on the 
ways and means of ensuring its political stability and security. Indeed, Russia has 
actively, if covertly, manipulated Georgia’s domestic vulnerabilities in an effort to retain 
the republic within its sphere of influence. Russia has acted in most cases as an 
initiator of, a participant in, and simultaneously as official mediator in these conflicts, 
openly favouring the secessionist side. In sum, Russia has become the problem, not 
the solution, in most of these cases.2 
Further, continued crisis in Chechnya has made Georgia a target for international 
terrorists, who had networked with some Chechen militants in the Pankisi Gorge, where 
several thousands of refugees from Chechnya had found shelter3. Moscow described 
the area as a training ground and arms smuggling route for the Chechen rebels. 
Georgia, although incapable of dealing with the problem on its own, has been 
persistently rejecting Russia’s demand to jointly conduct cleanup operations4. This has 
served as a cause for repeated violation of Georgia’s air space, including instances of 
bombing. 
Additionally, Russia has used various forms of economic blockade to reinforce 
coercion. Russia’s aggressive attitude towards Georgia, therefore, has played a 
decisive role in determining Georgia’s strategic choice–namely, seeking security 
guarantees in the West. The notion of security guarantees here is two-fold. First, the 
comprehensive political, economic and security aspects have to be mentioned. Given 
the circumstances, Georgia lacks enough resources to withstand Russia’s increasingly 
unfriendly policies. In such an insecure environment, promotion of any development 
                                            
1
 Rondeli, A., ‘The choice of Independent Georgia’, in: The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. 
Gennady Chufrin, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 14 
2
 Socor, V., ‘Europe must not lose sight of the frozen conflicts’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown 
Foundation, June 3-5, 2005 
3
 ‘U.S. diplomat says some Afghan terrorists linked with al-Qaida hide in Georgia’, Associated Press 
Newswires, February 11, 2002  
4
 Instead, Georgia asked the U.S. to help uproot armed rebels and criminals. Unsurprisingly, Russia was 
infuriated by the prompt U.S. decision to send 200 instructors to Georgia to train some 1200 Georgian 
special forces and provide light arms and communication systems.
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agenda is impossible. NATO membership, therefore, has become a top priority goal for 
the coming years. Further down the road, institutional integration into the European 
Union is considered to be the security ‘crown’, which would also provide a framework 
for sustainable economic development and prosperity. Second, a deepened 
internationalization of the conflict resolution, resulting in a decrease in Russia’s 
destructive role in the mediation and peacekeeping, has become an indispensable 
measure.5 The desired inclusion of the EU in the existing formats of negotiations, as 
well as engaging the US and the EU in pragmatic dialogue with Russia, will add to 
Georgia’s pro-Western orientation. 
Another determinant factor has been a choice of building a market-based 
democracy. This value-driven choice was based on Georgia’s historical gravitation 
towards Europe and receptivity to its values.6 Recently, however, the zest for 
democratization was fueled by a number of factors of different, yet interacting, nature: 
• As Georgians resisted for many years Russian totalitarianism (Tsarist Russia, 
Soviet Union, Russian Federation), Western culture has been considered by 
national elites as a potential and favorable counterbalance to the russification 
policy.7 Except for few alarmist voices aimed at alerting public opinion about the 
threats of cultural westernization, democratization is regarded as positive 
phenomenon; 
• After the World War II, Western-style liberal democracy established itself as the 
best political system, capable of delivering security, stability and prosperity. As a 
result, strong Georgian consensus developed in favor of liberal democracy;8 
                                            
5
 Georgia has taken a major step toward correcting or ending Moscow's "peacekeeping" and "mediating" 
activities in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts on Georgia's territory. Georgian parliamentary 
leaders in close consultation with the Presidency have initiated a resolution whereby the parliament sets 
deadlines for corrective measures or, alternatively, termination of those activities in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
6
 This is an under-researched topic. Some scholars argue that a sense of susceptibility of Georgians to 
the democratic values is of emotional genesis and/or is a matter of perception, rather than rooted in the 
national mentality. By contrast, others regard democratic values as an immanent feature of Georgian 
identity. One of the arguments that the proponents of the latter opinion often cite is that despite 70 years 
of centralized economy and totalitarianism under the Soviet rule, during which personal initiative was 
suppressed and a collective consciousness developed, Georgians fortunately did not lose either their 
centuries-old individuality or entrepreneurship. This was perhaps the primary reason for Georgia’s above-
average standard of living in the Soviet Union. Some of the few writings on this topic include: Nana 
Sumbadze and George Tarkhan-Mouravi, ‘Democratic Value Orientations & Political Culture in Georgia’, 
in: Occasional Papers in Public Administration & Public Policy of the NISPAcee (The Network of 
Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe), Bratislava, v. II, No 3, 
Summer 2001; Jones, S. ‘The role of cultural paradigms in Georgian foreign policy’ (manuscript), Mount 
Holyoke College, Mass., 1999 
7
 Sumbadze, N., Tarkhan-Mouravi, G., ‘Democratic Value Orientations & Political Culture in Georgia’, in: 
Occasional Papers in Public Administration & Public Policy of the NISPAcee (The Network of Institutes 
and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe), Bratislava, v. II, No 3, Summer 
2001, p.3 
8
 Nodia, G., ‘The dynamics and sustainability of the Rose Revolution’, in: Democratization in the 
European neighborhood, ed. M. Emerson, CEPS, Brussels, 2005, p.34 
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• The reputational quality and attractiveness of the EU and US, as the centers of 
democratic gravity, created the tendency for transition countries, including 
Georgia, to converge on the democratic model of development. Also, geographic 
and cultural-historical proximity played a role in this.9 
• Due to steady retreat from democracy, Russia’s normative political appeal for its 
neighbors has completely vanished. Despite its powerful geo-political position 
(especially energy and military aspects), Russia’s further bogging down in 
authoritarianism has reinforced pro-Europeanization drive in the ‘near abroad’.10 
The third motivation for choosing a pro-Western trajectory of development is closely 
related to utilization of Georgia’s transit capacity. Georgia provides a unique transit 
corridor for Caspian energy to Europe, as well as an irreplaceable access corridor for 
American-led and NATO forces to bases and operation theatres in Central Asia and the 
Greater Middle East.11 Georgia – a regional transport hub aligned solidly with the West 
– has become a regional ally for the West. Georgia’s capacity as a transit country 
attracts considerable interest from the international community. Georgia’s geographic 
location has acquired regional meaning, particularly with respect to the country’s 
potential role as a link between Europe and Asia. 
In early 90s, as the first talks on building East-West transport corridor started, few 
people would have believed in the prospects of the idea. It has required Herculean 
efforts and political courage of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and the 
US Administration to promote the building of an East-West energy corridor. Russia’s 
objection to the project posed a major obstacle. Additionally, innumerable rounds of 
negotiations had been held between the stakeholders, including predominantly Western 
construction companies and investors, to finalize the agreements. On May 25, 2005 the 
presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, as well as BP President 
Lord John Browne, U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, State Department South 
Caucasus Envoy Steven Mann, European Union Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs 
(of Latvia), and other high-level officials cut the ribbon of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
oil pipeline, manifesting the culmination of unprecedented undertaking. The South 
Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCGP), another transregional project, bringing Azeri gas to 
Turkey and onwards to Europe, is due in 2006. 
                                            
9
 Emerson, M., ‘European Neighborhood Policy: strategy or placebo?’, CEPS Working Document, No. 
215, November 2004, p. 5 
10
 Emerson, M., Noutcheva, G., ‘Europeanization as a gravity model of democratization’, CEPS Working 
Document, No. 214, November, 2004, p. 17 
11
 Socor, V., ‘The frozen conflicts: a challenge to Euro-Atlantic interests’, in: Report for the 2004 NATO 
summit, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, 2004 
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Georgia’s transit role also implies the transportation of passengers and cargo. To 
this end, more than a decade ago, the EU launched a regional program, TRACECA 
(Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia, a set of projects for overland 
commodity transport and communications along the historic Silk Road). In the long run, 
as the transit corridor develops, it will attract further foreign investments, which will lead 
to the promotion of contemporary business ethics and, more specifically, the 
establishment of Western values. The institutionalization of market economic principles 
in the region should be conducive to the processes of democratization and reform in the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia. Accordingly, the transit corridor could become the 
“corridor of values”, promoting the establishment of stability guarantees between the 
states of Eurasia in the future. 
Georgia is a Western-friendly country. Western orientation is resting on a broadly-
based political and societal consensus.12 This makes the choice non-susceptible to the 
influence of other policy variables. At the same time, Western orientation is hardly 
specified as either European or American. Nonetheless, the European idea and the EU 
itself continue to exert their magnetic force here. Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s new 
President, has adopted strong pro-EU rhetoric from the very beginning. He rarely 
misses a chance to highlight his European aspirations. On the day of his inauguration, 
along with the new Georgian flag, he raised the EU’s standard in front of the Parliament 
building. He even went farther by saying in one of his interviews in Brussels that 
Georgia will become a member of the EU during the tenure of the next Georgian 
President to be elected in 2009.13 The very recent manifestation of Saakashvili’s pro-
Europeanization stance has been the establishment, together with the Ukrainian 
President, of the Community of Democratic Choice. Georgia’s European aspirations are 
also clearly stated in a recently adopted National Security Concept saying that 
institutional integration into NATO and EU is a top foreign policy priority.14 However, as 
we will see later in the chapter, a variety of factors, such as political feasibility and a 
weak institutional capacity of the government, etc. sometimes hurts the ‘European’ 
component of the Western orientation. 
 
                                            
12
 Socor, V., ‘Building stability and security in the South Caucasus: multilateral security and the role of 
NATO’, in: Report for the 2004 NATO summit, The Central Asia Caucasus Institute, School of Advanced 
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 2004 
13
 Kapanadze, S., ‘The paths to Europe’, 24 Hours, No. 26, April 9, 2004 
14
 National Security Concept of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2005, p. 38 
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2.2 Government’s ENP-readiness 
28 November 2005 has marked the beginning of the negotiations between EC and 
Georgia on the ENP Action Plan (ENAP). The primary objective of the Georgian 
government is to effectively handle the whole ENP process, including both the 
negotiations on the ENAP and its implementation. This subchapter examines the extent 
to which the Georgian government is prepared for this process. The following 
subsections will discuss its various aspects. 
2.2.1 ENP-awareness 
European integration logic is understood in different ways by different actors. The 
way it is understood in Georgia still differs from the perception by EU official structures, 
governments of Member States or the European population. To the extent to which 
these differences persist, the negotiations on the ENP Action Plan (ENAP) as well as 
the process of its implementation may prove either productive or complicated. 
Evidently, there has been an evolution in the meaning of Georgia’s inclusion in the 
ENP. Initially, the post-revolutionary euphoria in Georgia contributed to galvanizing 
emotive judgment at all levels. As mentioned earlier, Georgia’s President had provided 
a timeline for Georgia’s accession to EU. This was preceded by the appearance of 
European Union’s flags outside all state-owned buildings. One of the squares in the 
historical district was renamed Europe’s Square. This has contributed to the creation of 
unprecedented expectations both among the general public and among government 
officials. Ministers and their deputies would decorate new offices with stationery and 
other office supplies marked by the EU logo. At the time most of the officials would 
have considered the ENP as a springboard for subsequent EU accession, while just a 
few of them would have properly read the ENP documentation. 
The emotional character and impatience of Georgians, however, were not the only 
reasons for this naiveté. The concept of ENP itself has certain shortcomings. 
Particularly, it is ambiguous. The ENP ultimate goals remain hybrid and the policy can 
be interpreted both as a potential long-term pre-accession strategy and as an enhanced 
partnership framework.15 As former EC President Romano Prodi initially argued, this 
quest for striking a balance between partnership and membership should not ‘exclude 
the latter.’ The Commission has later played down – and even explicitly excluded – 
                                            
15
 Subchapter 2.4 discusses in more detail the strengths and weaknesses of the ENP. 
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such an option. But this formulation is in fact emblematic of the very dangerous 
oxymoron contained in the ENP. 16 
In the meantime, emotive judgments gave place to more sober rhetoric. General 
awareness has been noticeably raised across the government. Staffing with relatively 
skilled personnel, as well as implementation of some EU-funded capacity building 
projects were among contributing factors. The highest level of understanding of the 
ENP process resides, however, in the Parliamentary Committee on EU Integration, the 
State minister’s Office on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Public speeches and interviews, as well as the quality of official 
documentation justify this view. The Prime Minister, visiting EU headquarters in 
December 2005, said that Georgia’s goal is to join the European Union but is 
concentrating for the time being on the negotiations for an action plan that would be 
designed to strengthen ties under the ENP. “We do not want to talk at this stage of 
Georgia’s target of EU membership, especially taking into account the current 
circumstances in the EU…”17 Nonetheless, the ENP is perceived to be a temporary 
substitute for something which the EU will be unable to deny in the long run. 
It appears that focusing on the ENP in the wake of Brussels’ constitutional and 
budgetary wrangles is about to become a policy. But certain issues still remain 
seemingly problematic: 
• Expectations in Tbilisi that Brussels will provide additional incentives initially 
unforeseen by the ENP. The Georgian government has been assertive prior to 
and during the first round of the ENAP negotiations.18 The Georgian side sought 
agreement on the priority issue areas, such as trade liberalization and 
simplification of a visa regime. More importantly, though, Georgia tried to convince 
the EU negotiators of the need for more active role in solving conflicts in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, Giorgy Baramidze, State Minister on EU and Euro-
Atlantic Integration, speaking at a high profile forum in Tbilisi, slammed the EU for 
not speaking ‘bluntly’ with Russia concerning conflicts in Georgia. He called EU’s 
position cynical and added that Georgia expects more from the EU.19 In unison 
with this statement Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze said 
that the EU “should not turn a blind eye” to Russia’s double-standard policy in the 
region.20 Additionally, Georgia has sought incentives that would in a certain sense 
informally grant Georgia the ‘between-partnership and-membership’ status. Sub-
chapter 2.3.3 will discuss Georgia’s expectations in more detail. 
                                            
16
 Tassinari, F., ‘On the perils of Europe’s ‘difference’: security, integration and the case for regionalism in 
the EU neighborhood strategy’ (manuscript), CEPS, Brussels, 2005, p. 9 
17
 European Report, 30 November, 2005  
18
 The round took place on 28-29 November, 2005 
19
 Civil Georgia, 22 November, 2005  
20
 Civil Georgia, 23 November, 2005  
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• Differing attitudes in Brussels and Tbilisi towards the very process of the ENAP 
negotiations. The point here is that Brussels is accustomed to certain rules 
regarding agenda setting and process leading. Brussels sets the terms and 
determines the conditions of relations with European neighbors. Neighbors may 
receive rather substantial and attractive offers of cooperation but are hardly in a 
position to negotiate them. They may be consulted, but planning and decision-
making, as well the conditions for cooperation, are rarely a shared process.21 This 
is something that is not necessarily expected in Tbilisi. The new elite will likely be 
presumptuous and less subservient towards EU. Giorgy Baramidze, State Minister 
on EU and Euro-Atlantic Integration, told a high-level gathering on the anniversary 
of Rose Revolution: “This government knows better than anyone sitting in 
Brussels how to make this country peaceful, secure and prosperous.… [We] think 
that Georgia is now strong enough, mature enough… to ask the EU [to consider] 
… our principles, our priorities.”22 Although views and attitudes on both sides 
change rather quickly, this example still reveals the need for a flexible pattern of 
negotiations so that the process will be mutually beneficial. 
2.2.2 Institutional Capacity 
President Saakashvili’s government inherited very weak institutions from the 
previous regime. The public sector reform produced by the Rose Revolution has almost 
skipped to another, slightly better model reducing the state regulatory functions. A Civil 
Service Council and Civil Service Bureau have been set up by Presidential decree to 
promote the creation of modern public service. The number of ministries has been 
reduced from 18 to 14, and numerous state departments and agencies have been 
abolished or brought under the responsibility of Ministries. The Law on Public Service 
has been amended and the Law on the Structure, Competencies and Rules of Activity 
of the Government has been adopted. At the same time institutions remained weak and 
to some extent lowered their capacity, resulting in widespread reduction and staff 
changes in all ministries. This affected the so-called institutional memory of 
Governmental structures. In new circumstances, it became difficult for the majority of 
agencies to explain obvious issues such as their obligations under the PCA. 
Several Capacity Building exercises have been promoted by EU projects.23 One of 
them – TACIS funded Support to PCA Implementation in Georgia (SIPCA) – was 
designed to upgrade the overall knowledge of PCA and ENP related issues. This task 
was partially useful for the creation demand on services. The 5th phase of Georgian-
European Policy and Legal Advice Center (GEPLAC) is supposed to deliver this 
                                            
21
 Tassinari, op.cit., p. 6 
22
 Owen, E., ‘Georgia: moving from revolution to democratic institutions,’ Eurasia Insight, 28 November 
2005 
23
 Since 2004 the ‘rule of law’ mission EUJUST-THEMIS has been conducted in Georgia. This is the first 
mission of its kind carried out within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
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demand. Special emphasis will be put on strengthening the EU Integration units, 
formally created in almost all governmental structures (in accordance with Enactment 
22, 2004). Their functions include active coordination of the work on PCA (and soon 
ENP) related matters through their ministries. These structures have to establish strong 
horizontal bridges with the State Minister’s office for European and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration. Also, the EU Integration units should contribute to the Governmental 
Commission for Georgia’s Integration in the EU, which is the highest body and is 
chaired by the Prime Minister. 
For the purposes of this study, 25 representatives of all EU Integration units were 
interviewed. The specific expected output of the interviews was the stock-taking of 
views, requests and concerns of the participants. The following summary of the 
interviews provides a from-within-vision of the government’s EU-capacity: 
• Several respondents expressed their worries caused by either a lack of 
awareness and/or disinterest in EU-related matters in their ministries. It was 
pointed out that the source of the problem is usually top management. As a result, 
the work on EU-related issues is deranged and the coordination is poor (MoEn, 
MoEnv, MoA). In contrast, a representative of the Parliamentary Committee on EU 
Integration has stressed that in general the legislature is supportive of Georgia’s 
Europeanization and has made EU integration a policy priority. 
• Another problem, closely related to the previous one, is a precarious status of the 
EU integration units in some of the ministries. Frequent changes of structure of 
the ministries affect EU integration units’ functional capacity (MoEdu, MoLHSA). In 
the worst cases, these changes have caused the disintegration of this function, 
having led to the loss of institutional memory (MoA). Even more discouraging, in 
some ministries the EU-driven activities have never acquired the institutional form 
at all (MoEnv). 
• Various respondents have stressed the fact that there is no community of interests 
in and similarity of attitudes toward Georgia’s European vocation across the 
government. Until and unless this ideological hurdle is cleared the mentioned 
problems in some line ministries will remain (MoEnv, MoA). 
• One interviewee has mentioned an extant clan mentality in personnel recruitment 
and bureaucratic appointments as a problem as serious as corruption (MoA). 
• Incompetence of public servants to effectively negotiate the donor assistance, 
including an absence of training in crafting terms of reference, has been pointed 
out as a disappointing fact (Parliamentary Commission on EU Integration). 
Arguably, there is certain subjectivity in these judgments, but, evidently, the problem 
of lacking ENP-awareness and institutional capacity in varying degree persists across 
the government structures. 
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2.2.3 Europeanization: an Uncompromising Choice? 
Europeanization is understood as a ‘process of convergence on modern European 
norms and values.’24 This section seeks to evaluate the extent to which the conditions 
are favorable in Georgia for this process to start. In fact, the process has already 
started, as the PCA has been already implemented over the years. Obviously, the case 
in point is a process of different quality with different objectives. 
The previous section discussed general awareness and institutional capacity of 
Georgian government to handle the ENP process. This section focuses on whether 
Europeanization as a process of development, perceived through current 
understanding of the ENP, fits well Georgia’s short- and long-term political and security 
agenda as well as general objectives of economic modernization. 
The Rose Revolution inspired a higher level of confidence and expectations, which 
in turn have created a strong motivation for achievements. The government keeps 
raising expectations, which are indeed huge for coming 4-5 year time span: 
• Peaceful restoration of territorial integrity; 
• Accession to NATO; 
• Sustainability of economic growth; 
• Rehabilitated and developed infrastructure. 
Georgian elites have been filled with a sense that it is quite possible to ‘make the 
Earth spin around its axis quicker’ and are eager to embark on fast modernization of the 
country. Impatience and hastiness have become major features of the government’s 
result-oriented activities. 
Given the circumstances, an objective need for a new vision and a comprehensive 
strategy has been created. Georgians have always been bad at conceptualizing the 
solutions. Until recently, political elites have been unable to formulate sound political 
strategies or explicit and clear concept of development, except for, perhaps, foreign 
policy orientation. However, in the new environment the government becomes 
increasingly aware of the necessity of well-informed decisions derived from preliminarily 
devised strategy plans. This has stimulated the recent adoption of a long-awaited 
National Security Concept. Also, a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), a 
new document that prioritizes expenditures for the next five years, has taken effect this 
year. At the same time, there are few other strategy documents that either remain 
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formally in force but lack due attention, or are condemned and are collecting dust on 
shelves. These documents are National Plan for Law Harmonization (NPLH) and 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program (EDPRP), respectively. The 
main reason for disregarding the latter is political, as it was adopted earlier by the 
previous government. Furthermore, the new government tries to avoid emphasizing 
poverty as a policy issue. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that EDPRP needs to be re-
activated after necessary adjustments. 
Against this background the ENAP, another strategy document, comes to the 
agenda. Here, the problem of ensuring the coherence of ENAP, NPLH, EDPRP and 
MTEF by reconciling their priorities and provisions emerges as a serious challenge. It is 
indeed a challenge because there is no uniform attitude across the government towards 
the ways and means of fulfilling these expectations. One thing is obvious – territorial 
reunification, NATO accession and fast economic modernization as policy priorities will 
not change under any circumstances. As the incumbent President plans to seek re-
election in 2009, his government’s primary objective is to deliver promises. More 
importantly, this agenda is widely shared by the electorate, though some of its better 
informed parts may not consider it realistic. Here the legitimate question arises: Are the 
existing and/or pending strategy documents, such as ENAP, either individually or 
collectively ensuring the achievement of the mentioned goals? The immediate answer 
that the government today might have is ‘No.’ In order to make existing strategies work 
for the mentioned agenda, the State Minister’s office on Coordination of Reforms is 
currently drafting a comprehensive framework document – Georgian Government’s 
Mid-Term Action Strategy (2006-2009) – aimed at adapting existing strategies to this 
agenda. 
The first round of ENAP negotiations has proved that the compatibility of the current 
Georgian deregulatory policy and the EU focus on regulatory minimum and key 
institutions remains an important issue. Partly due to this the Georgian side seemed 
unprepared for the sector-specific dialogue. Instead, it has tried to focus on those 
priority areas, which to a greater extent corresponded to the above mentioned mid-term 
goals. Two types of constraining contexts deserve attention: 
• By the time ENAP negotiations launched, the mood in the Georgian government 
had become resolute and somewhat aggressive. In fact, the attitudes have tended 
to change as the Georgian side demonstrates signs of flexibility. Still, it has been 
firmly stuck in the heads of policy making elite that over the past decade the EU 
could but did not engage in solving Georgia’s outstanding security problems. The 
EU’s reputation has been significantly undermined especially during last five 
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years, as the EU-Russia rapprochement prevented it from opposing Russia’s 
aggressive policy towards Georgia. The recent example is EU’s refusal to pick up 
the Russian-dipped OSCE Border Monitoring Mission. Later, disappointment 
continued to grow when the EU decided to deploy a border monitoring mission in 
Transnistria, Moldova. Now the attitude is as follows: “We have an agenda, you 
have resources, so come and make up for lost time.” Chapter 3 examines whether 
current EU-Russia relations can make room for the EU to start pressing Russia to 
play a constructive role in conflict resolution; 
• Some elements of fast economic modernization have already been introduced, 
while others stand in line: E.g. already 85 per cent of the licensing laws have been 
abolished, including the ones for car safety, food, and industrial standards, all of 
which, allegedly, invited corruption. The whole philosophy of this agenda is to 
reduce to a minimum State’s intervention through total liberalization and 
deregulation of Georgia’s economy. Expected results are: curbed corruption, 
attracted investments, sustained economic growth. However, the jury is still out on 
whether this policy is a viable long-term development strategy. Some 
commentators argue that a zeal for abolition of licenses often leads to 
unnecessary abolition of the institutions. The philosophy of fast reforms, 
emanating from the Office of the State Minister for Economic Reforms, is 
increasingly shared across the government. However, it is too early to argue that 
the idea is endorsed by the entire decision making elite. Apparently, there are also 
genuine pro-European forces supporting a gradual process of approximation. 
Anyway, the logic behind the idea of fast economic modernization is as follows: 
“Since the prospect of EU accession is not looming at all, we can’t wait with fast 
economic reforms. When the people are fed, we will take care of the environment 
and consumer protection issues. Compliance with the EU acquis is not a priority 
now.” 
One of the areas already affected by the modernization agenda is competition 
policy. The current state of affairs in this area has already caused intensive 
discussions, ever since the enforcement of the Law on Free Trade and Competition on 
12 July 2005. “Taken against the logic of economic transformation to a functioning 
market economy, the law fails to duly regulate such principal issues in the system of 
competition protection as mergers and acquisitions, abuse of dominant position and 
state monopolies of commercial character. As a result, the quality of goods and 
services available on the market have deteriorated, with corresponding risks for 
consumers from insufficient product safety, and even, in the longer run, to economic 
instability through uncontrolled price rises. Needless to say that this situation is 
inconsistent with EU acquis and needs to be changed according to the agreed ENAP 
provisions.”25 
Other spheres affected by policies contradictory to EU acquis include State Aid, 
banking and licensing. Although GEPLAC will be focusing on this issue in its advisory 
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activities, the EU may need greater flexibility and conditionality to ensure the successful 
start of Georgia’s Europeanization. As is evidenced from practice, however—depending 
on the relative balance of the different domestic forces and the interaction between 
them—the overall effect of EU conditionality will be positive, negative or nil.26 
Apparently, there is a need for making a point with the Georgian government that 
fast modernization and Europeanization are not mutually exclusive processes. Instead, 
Europeanization with a reasonably built-in modernization agenda will ensure 
accomplishment of both medium and long-term goals, such as institutional upgrade to 
the EU standards. Also, Europeanization upon concourse of circumstances may 
become a contributing factor in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Otherwise, as Ghia 
Nodia argues, the agenda of fast modernization with its built-in tasks of cultural 
revolution, in combination with a weak civil society (including the political opposition) 
and the absence of any social players who are strong enough to counterbalance the 
activist government, look like a recipe for authoritarianism.27 Frequent citation by 
proponents of unilateral fast modernization of successful autocratic modernizers, such 
as Asian tigers, etc., may prove misleading, as the Georgian context is absolutely 
different. 
2.3 From PCA to ENP 
2.3.1 PCA: a Failed Policy or a Stepping Stone? 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is so far the only legal basis for 
cooperation between Georgia and EU. The aim of the PCA is to encourage political, 
commercial, economic and cultural cooperation between Georgia and the EU. It is the 
embodiment of the joint commitment of the EU and Georgia to promote partnership and 
understanding for mutual benefit. Signed in 1996, the PCA entered into force in 1999 
and opened a new chapter in EU-Georgia relations. At the same time that the PCA was 
enacted, Georgia entered the WTO and the Council of Europe. Although there has 
been an overlap of the PCA’s provisions related to trade and human rights with those of 
the WTO and the Council of Europe respectively, there are other areas in which the 
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PCA provides an indispensable base, such as political dialogue, law approximation and 
community assistance.28 
The PCA represents a visionary commitment from both sides. It is ambitious in 
scope, covering almost all aspects of European Community-Georgia trade, commercial 
and economic relations, and instituting political communication up to the highest levels. 
It places a respect for human rights and democratic processes at the very core of the 
relationship. 
Despite initial high hopes and expectations, however, the PCA, on balance, has 
proved to be a rather vague instrument, unable to stimulate full-scale political and 
strategic partnership. On the one hand, the framework has created a constructive 
political and institutional infrastructure for EU-Georgia relationship. According to the 
PCA’s provisions several co-operation bodies have been established at different 
institutional levels, with the Cooperation Council being the highest. A significant part of 
Georgian primary legislation has been harmonized with acquis. On the other hand, The 
PCA implementation was not supported by mutually planned and agreed actions with 
proper conditionality and timeframe components.29 The economic performance of the 
country has remained poor and its political reform has also been too modest. 
Stagnation and disillusionment have become the most appropriate attributes of the 
country’s state of affairs. For its part, the EU maintained its presence in Georgia without 
holding any clear vision for future relations.30 As with some other countries, the EU has 
abstained from Georgia’s active political conditionality that might have been a driving 
force for reforms. European economic instruments of aid and trade policy were never 
strongly integrated with Georgian economic policy conditions.31 Further, although an 
appointment of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus in 2001 has 
signaled an increasing EU interest in the region, a policy of neglect has been 
maintained, as the new office was denied necessary resources and authority to involve 
itself effectively in the resolution of the most crucial problems facing Georgia.32 As a 
result, the EU has failed to take up an active role as a foreign and security policy actor 
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in the country. Therefore, the EU, by and large, has remained merely a donor 
organization, rather than a drive for a major transformation. Meanwhile, as Georgia was 
increasingly regarded as a failed state, no one in Brussels would place it on the shaping 
political map of the Wider Europe. Consequently, the PCA was marginalized and 
ceased being topical. It was not until the Rose Revolution when the new prospects of 
cooperation surfaced again, rejuvenating a PCA with a new raison d’être. 
2.3.2 ENP: a Tool for Regional Cooperation? 
While strengthening the prospects of achieving the ENP’s overall goals, the 
Commission intends to contribute to regional cooperation in the neighbourhood. 
Regarding the South Caucasus, there had already been a plethora of proposals, 
including those initiated or supported by powerful governments and international 
organizations. Aimed at encouraging trilateral cooperation in the region, these initiatives 
have all failed due to a dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh. The Conflict has necessitated fundamental foreign policy divisions in the 
South Caucasus. Countries in the region tend to build strategic and security ties with 
different global and regional powers whose policy agendas in the South Caucasus are 
based on conflicting objectives. As a result, one country seeks security guarantees with 
Russia, while others aspire to NATO membership for the same reason. This divergence 
of foreign policy and security priorities are among impediments to genuine strategic 
partnership and integration in the South Caucasus. The answer to the chicken-and-egg 
question as to what comes first, - conflict settlement or economic cooperation? – has 
long been prevalent in the region. Therefore, until and unless the solution to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is found, any effort to put in motion the full-fledged regional 
cooperation will be doomed to failure. The glaring example of how the existing 
controversies in the region can reverberate in the ENP process is an issue of the 
proposed project of building railway line between Kars (Turkey) and Akhalkalaki 
(Georgia). The point is that Armenia views future trans-regional railway project as a 
rival to the existing Kars-Gyumri (Armenia) railway, decommissioned in 1993 due to 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has tried to use diplomatic pressure through 
strong lobbies in the U.S. and Europe and the Armenian community in Georgia to 
prevent potential construction of the project.33 Armenia views the ENP as an additional 
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tool to promote its interest. As expected, Azerbaijan and Georgia will also seek support 
for the KATB project34 through negotiated ENAPs. 
Against this background, Georgia views the ENP’s regional role in fostering 
cooperation within the Black Sea area. Particular importance is attached to 
strengthening bilateral ties with Europe-oriented Black Sea littoral states and 
multilateral initiatives, such as the development of transportation and communication 
links, as well as energy transit, etc. The Georgian government holds that giving ENP 
dimension to the BSEC and GUAM initiatives will both bring additional political as well 
as economic benefits to the EU and allow the concerned countries to exploit the 
potential benefits of cooperation, particularly in the field of infrastructure development, 
trade and investments.35 
2.3.3 ENP’s Outcome: Two Sets of Expected Results 
Despite ever shrinking discrepancy between Georgia’s and EU’s readings of the 
ENP process, the two sides still differ in highlighting the key objectives of the action 
plan. While the EU employs rather general phraseology in identifying its objectives, 
Georgia’s language is more specific and the menu more diverse. Interestingly, the EU’s 
objectives are predominantly process-oriented and are aiming at long term perspective. 
The nature of these objectives is mainly related to strengthening democracy and 
building functional market economy. Georgia’s priorities are mostly short term and are 
focused on national security issues requiring immediate action. Certainly, there are also 
common goals that the each side would like to see as outcomes of the action plan. 
What follows is a very general description of these objectives: 
(a) The ultimate goal of the ENP process from the EU’s perspective would be to 
upgrade Georgia to a modern democracy with viable state institutions so that it is able 
to serve as an effective partner for the EU in averting common threats such as 
international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc. In 
the meantime, the upgrade implies a routine process of approximation, which takes a 
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while, with the EU norms and standards according to the acquis. Areas of primary focus 
will be standardization, food safety, competition policy and sustainable development. 
(b) Georgia’s expectations are manifold. The top priority is to engage the EU in the 
peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To this end Georgia 
intends to seek: the EU’s participation in the existing or new formats of negotiations; 
enhanced role of the EU Special Representative (EUSR); the EU’s support of the 
Peace Plan for settlement of conflict in South Ossetia; inclusion of Georgia’s security 
issues in the ongoing EU-Russia dialogue. The other objectives include but are not 
limited to: 
• Establishment of independent judiciary, based on the implementation of the 
reform strategy for the criminal justice system developed by an EU-funded 
EUJUST Themis project (“rule of law mission”); 
• Strengthening border monitoring capacity and intensifying co-operation with the 
EU on border protection issues, including increasing administrative and technical 
capacity, equipping and training of border guards;36 
• EU to encourage Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia to negotiate agreements with 
Georgia on border delimitation; 
• Simplification of visa procedures for Georgian citizens traveling to the EU member 
states; 37 
• Simplification of the regulations for workers to migrate to the EU member states; 
• Establishment of preconditions for realization of the Four Freedoms;38 
• Enhancing EU-Georgia cooperation on CFSP starting with inviting Georgia, on a 
case by case basis, to align with EU positions on regional and international 
issues; 
• Start consultations on Free Trade Agreement; 
• Increase the share of investment component in the future aid; 
• Unlike Tacis arrangements, allow Georgia to dispose financial assistance at its 
own discretion (similar to the US Millennium Challenge Account); 
• Extension of the EIB mandate to Georgia 
(c) Among the goals that are equally important for both sides is integrating Georgia 
in transport and energy networks of the EU in order to fully utilize the country’s transit 
potential and ensure effective partnership in the areas of energy and transport between 
the EU and the states in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. This will become 
particularly important as Europe becomes increasingly aware of the importance of 
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including Caspian hydrocarbons in the renewed schemes of diversification of energy 
supplies. 
A brief review of the menu of Georgia’s ENP-related objectives/expectations clearly 
suggests that Georgia aspires to catch up with Ukraine and Moldova in the 
Europeanization process. In other words, Georgia would like to have its ENAP equally 
stuffed with incentives to better match its post-Rose Revolution ambitions. Additionally, 
Georgia, as a post-revolutionary country, expects to receive a special, if preferential, 
treatment in the ENP process. Sure of its capacity to advance reforms quicker than the 
neighbours in the region, Georgia insists on fair application of the ENP principle of 
differentiation. This might look somewhat confusing for Brussels since, unlike Moldova, 
the ENP in Georgia still has to acquire the policy anchor status vis-a-vis other 
competing strategies (see sub-chapter 2.2.3). 
3 EU in the Wake of Enlargement 
After five rounds of enlargement, the EU has expanded from a six-member entity 
into the world’s largest trading bloc with 25 Member States and population of 500 
million. 
Today the EU is a powerful integrating force but its power is not sufficiently reflected 
in its voice and external actions. The primary reason of this is that the EU’s priority is 
usually finding a compromise between a wide range of parties – producers and 
consumers, big and small states, regional and national governments.39 The host of 
factors contributes to its huge potential as a strong international actor. At the same time 
it faces challenges that reduce its ability to exert its transformative power over its new 
neighbours. 
This chapter argues that the single most important factor affecting the EU’s capacity 
to commit to Georgia’s Europeanization is relations with Russia. EU-Russian relations 
are unique in terms of the multiplicity of their dimensions. These range from technical 
trade cooperation, large-scale regional cooperation frameworks such as the Northern 
Dimension and space cooperation to joint action in combating organized crime and the 
nuclear safety programme. 
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3.1 Why Russia Matters? 
It is a widely shared view that Russia’s meaning for Europe is mainly of geopolitical 
nature. EU-Russian partnership in strategic issues would ensure the creation of a 
global multipolar order, something that some of the large European powers would seek. 
At the same time, EU’s growing reliance on Russian hydrocarbons has made a case for 
the geo-economic argument in favour of close partnership. 
The fact that the EU, the world’s second biggest gas consumer, is located next door 
to Russia, the world’s biggest gas producer, makes it eminently sensible for the two 
parties to determine how they can best serve each other’s requirements. The common 
strand in their relations points to an important but increasing reliance on Russian 
energy. 
Russia matters for Europe for other reasons too. In the areas of non-proliferation 
and combating organized crime, Russian cooperation brings significant added value to 
European security.40 Also, as noted in the Country Strategy Paper 2000-2006, drafted 
by the Commission, “soft security threats from Russia are a serious concern for the EU 
and require continued engagement – nuclear safety, the fight against crime, including 
drug trafficking and illegal immigration, the spread of disease and environmental 
pollution.”41 
The experts pay attention also to the aspect of transport in Russian-EU cooperation. 
Owing to its unique geographical position, the Russian Federation can offer the most 
convenient and safest route between Europe and Asia and reap essential economic 
benefits. At present the EU seeks to increase its presence on Russian transit routes; 
this would include, primarily, flight routes. Russia’s integration into Europe and the 
global economy could also be promoted through railroad traffic between Europe and 
Asia. 
3.2 EU-Russia Relationship: from Critique to Joint Strategic Projects 
Russia’s relations with the EU have remained rather complex and somewhat 
ambiguous throughout the recent decade. At the same time, Europe’s attitude towards 
modern Russia, by and large, has always been mild. Although there have been cases 
of telling criticism, however, the bilateral relationship has always been kept within the 
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bounds of pliant diplomacy. Nevertheless, as the EU has expressed certain criticism 
over the violation of human rights, especially in Chechnya, and raised objections to the 
restrictions of free media and business in Russia, a more conservative and nationalist 
segment of the Russian political elite increasingly perceives Europe as a potential 
political rival rather than a partner. The main factors preventing the EU and Russia from 
overcoming their many bilateral obstacles are the growing differences in values 
between their societies. Nonetheless, there have been cases of ignoring these 
differences. The most notorious case of pampering Russia was during December 2003 
EU-Russia summit when Berlusconi, then the President of the European Council, made 
remarks at press conference about volunteering to be Putin’s advocate over Chechnya. 
Somewhat strong language was used during the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) in January 2006 while criticizing Russia for continued human 
rights abuses in Chechnya and recent legislation curbing Russian NGOs. Particularly, 
Resolution 1479 (2006) stated that “violations still occur on a massive scale in the 
Chechen Republic and, in some cases, neighbouring regions in a climate of impunity.”42 
In the debates preceding the adoption of the Resolution, however, the MPs had used a 
language of varying degrees austerity. The MPs from the new EU entrants were the 
most critical, whereas the ‘old Europeans’ have been more selective in their 
expressions. The parliamentarians have mentioned energy dependence as the main 
reason for softening the tone.43 
The first visit of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Moscow in January 2006, 
just weeks after Russia’s nasty gas dispute with Ukraine, was perceived to be a 
demonstration of cooling down the bilateral relations. By openly questioning the 
Russian restriction on NGOs and Chechnya, Germany’s new Chancellor has struck a 
different chord in the relations between Moscow and Berlin. Nonetheless, both sides 
spoke glowingly about their close economic ties and how they could be strengthened. 
One of the biggest joint projects under way is the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) 
a route that will bypass Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states, transporting Russian gas 
direct to Germany. Being the largest consumer of Russian gas in Europe, Germany 
opts for crawfishing. While calling the NEGP “an investment in the energy security of 
Europe” Mrs Merkel, in fact, legitimizes Russia’s policy of divide et impera in Europe, 
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since the project clearly undermines the energy security of the new member states from 
Eastern Europe (already noted).44 
Meanwhile, the economic interaction between Russia and EU increases. But, 
notwithstanding the intensifying trade relations and institutional networks contributing to 
the mutual interdependence, the underlying world-views on various issues have 
remained divergent, and sources for competition and tension are present. In this 
context, the intention of the enlarged EU to launch a more active external policy 
towards the countries of the former Soviet Union receives an ambivalent response from 
the Russian leadership. Mostly, this policy, although not as immediate a threat as 
NATO’s possible expansion, is perceived as an encroachment on Russian national 
interests in the area, where maintaining its influence would be seen essential in order to 
remain a global political player.45 
3.3 Dependence or Interdependence? 
As for the EU, Russia is today the single most important external supplier of natural 
gas and oil, some commentators say there is a risk of the EU becoming so dependent 
on energy supplies from Russia that it constrains EU head of states from criticizing any 
failings in the development of Russian democracy, human rights and freedom of press. 
European energy dependence will increase over the foreseeable future as North 
Sea production declines. According to the Commission Green Paper on security of 
energy supply (November 2000) the EU’s dependence on energy imports will increase 
from 50% to 70% by 2030. The particular situation for gas is described as follows: 
• 40% of EU gas imports originate from Russia (30% Algeria, 25% Norway); 
• By 2030, over 60% of EU gas imports are expected to come from Russia with 
overall dependency expected to reach 80%. 
Europe’s dependency on gas from Russia and oil from the unstable Middle East 
might lead to serious economic risks but could also stir up animosities between EU 
member states themselves. Countries such as Poland are very worried that Russia has 
too much leverage over the EU because of this gas dependency. 
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The state-run Gazprom supplies about a quarter of gas consumed in Europe, with 
Poland importing 62 per cent, Germany 30 percent, France about 25 percent and Italy 
20 percent of their gas consumption from Russia. 
The Commission has warned that Europe’s dependency on gas imports is set to rise 
further, with Russia expected to provide the EU with around half of its imports by 2020. 
At the moment the EU imports some 4 million barrels a day from Russia, which is 
equivalent to over 90 per cent of the country’s output. It is possible that Europe’s 
Russian imports could go down by a proportionate amount, as Greece, Italy, France 
and Spain, as well as Turkey will provide the most obvious initial markets for the new 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline output.46 Experts anticipate that the European oil 
demand picture could change drastically by 2008.47 
On the other hand, EU is Russia’s main economic partner. Bilateral trade amounted 
to about €100 billion in 2005. Over 60% of Russia’s export revenue comes from energy, 
and most of it is in the form of exports to the EU. Sales of its raw materials to the EU 
provide foreign currency and over 40% of the federal budget. So Russia is as 
dependent on the EU as the EU is on Russia. 
3.4 Regional Rivals? 
Since Russia remains a neighbour, the EU will have to pursue two neighbourhood 
policies and attune them to one another. The EU’s relationship with Russia influences 
its neighbourhood policy. While Russia is seeking to re-assert its influence over its 
‘backyard’, the EU is also aspiring to engage with many of the same countries. Neither 
side is yet sure how much their two agendas will conflict. But already potential tensions 
are emerging. For example, if the EU tries to get involved in resolving frozen conflicts in 
the Black Sea region, such as those in Transnistria in Moldova or South Ossetia in 
Georgia, tensions could arise. Russia has troops in both these areas, as well as in 
Abkhazia, and Moscow will strongly resist EU attempts to reduce its influence there. 
Many Russian policy-makers see their country as a strategic competitor of the EU and 
the US in what they regard as Russia’s natural sphere of influence.48 
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In Georgia, as elsewhere in the “near abroad”, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
seeks to implement the doctrine of a “liberal empire”.49 Authored by Anatoly Chubais, 
the Chairman of the United Energy Systems (UES), the concept encourages the 
construction of an alternative empire to NATO and EU. Russia can do this using its rich 
public-private monopolies to take over the key industries and economic institutions of 
former Soviet republics, thereby laying the groundwork for political domination. 
Given the deficiencies of Russia’s political and economic institutions, there is a 
strong case for Europe to reach out more boldly to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, just 
as it did to the Western Balkans and Turkey. But it is important to recognize the 
resistance to further enlargement that has grown within the Union countries and the 
reasons for it. 
3.5 EU-Georgia: Prospects for Engagement 
The EU should get serious about Georgia for several important reasons. These 
reasons are well articulated in the Mark Leonard’s and Charles Grant’s piece:50 
• The situation in Georgia has implications beyond the Caucasus region. The 
conflict zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become international centers 
of smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal arms deals, and potentially even terrorism. If 
ethnic cleansing and aggressive nationalism returned to the region, the 
implications could stretch far beyond Georgia’s borders; 
• Political instability in Georgia would have economic implications for the EU. 
Georgia has become an important transit route for oil and gas from the Caspian 
area. Although Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves are not as big as those in 
Russia or the Middle East, they could help to decrease Europe’s dependence on 
those potentially unstable regions; 
• The EU could have a profound effect at very little cost. Georgia represents an 
important test of the EU’s ability to take responsibility for the security of the 
European neighbourhood, and to develop a meaningful policy for a country that 
cannot yet be considered a candidate for accession. More specifically, Georgia is 
a test-case for the ENP. 
On the other hand, the Georgian government still has to prove it is willing to do the 
hard work to approach the EU. In this regard crucial importance should be placed on 
realizing genuine economic reforms, creating a law-abiding culture, promoting media 
pluralism, and abandoning plans for military solution to any of its conflicts. 
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But if Georgia delivers, the EU must be ready to engage more fully. Until recently, 
EU-Georgia relationship mostly has been the one between a donor and recipient. As a 
matter of fact, the EU has become one of the biggest donors in Georgia—unfortunately, 
though, it lacks a strategic vision in the Caucasus. A wide range of projects have been 
funded by the EU, and some of them have been tremendously beneficial to Georgia.51 
Still, the approach is not strategic. The best example of this would be the TRACECA 
program, which is largely under-funded and ignored in terms of political support. The 
EU needs to define its objectives in a more focused way, and then figure out which 
projects would fulfill them. 
The EU needs to develop a more coherent, consistent and ambitious policy for 
Georgia. Even if membership is not possible in the foreseeable future, the EU needs to 
develop a more substantive process to engage Georgia and integrate it into its policies. 
If the EU fails to build a more credible and substantive policy, it will constantly have to 
manage crises in its backyard, and Georgia in particular. That would be much more 
expensive and difficult than devising an effective strategy now. Also, this strategy would 
discourage the Georgian government to link its domestic reforms to the requirements of 
the EU. 
In all fairness, the Commission’s latest country strategy paper sets forth priorities for 
EU aid. More importantly, though, the EU Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
in its February 21st Declaration expressed strong support to Georgia’s attempt to 
unfreeze the conflict in South Ossetia. The Declaration (see Appendix E) came after 
Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution on withdrawal of of the Russian 
peacekeeping troops from the conflict zone (see Appendix F). Notably, the Declaration 
promises that the EU is ready to “contribute actively and in every relevant forum” to 
demilitarization and conflict resolution in South Ossetia. While the Declaration supports 
the Georgian drive to encourage increased international participation and to revise the 
current format of talks, the commentators disagree on whether the EU’s active 
engagement in resolving Georgia’s outstanding security problems is already 
predetermined. 52 
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Can the EU become a counterweight to Russia? By launching the ENP the EU’s 
weight and motivation have significantly increased. Yet it’s true that its very own 
neighbourhood is precisely where the EU’s ability to exert influence is weakest and 
Europe’s power structuration becomes most fuzzy. Still, additional stimulus could raise 
awareness about the necessity of looking into possibilities of tapping oil and gas from 
the Caspian for the sake of its own security. 
“Europe should get an alternative energy corridor linking it to Central Asia, through 
the Caucasus, via the Black Sea as well as via Turkey,” said President Saakashvili.53 
The cut-off in gas supplies in January 2005 underscores for all consumer countries the 
urgency of breaking their overdependence on Russian supplies. These are proving 
politically unreliable, commercially onerous, and insufficiently available, even in the 
short term for all internal and external customers of Russian energy supplies. 
Enhancing regional security through intensified cooperation between the EU and 
Georgia, however, would be impossible without keeping in mind competing economic 
and strategic interests of Russia in the Region. Some representatives of the Russian 
political elite regard Georgia’s Europeanization as a most serious long-term threat 
because it will result in Russia’s “administrative expulsion” from the region. 
Convergence on EU norms and standards both in terms of legislation and institutional 
building, they hold, would eventually lead to the establishment of totally different rules 
of the game—rules which make Russia a weak player. That is why Moscow has no vital 
interest in the success of the ENP process in Georgia and is seeking to enhance its 
‘liberal empire’ in the South Caucasus through a new economic policy.54 Profiting by the 
EU’s slowness to formulate a clear policy towards the region, Russia uses its political 
and economic instruments to influence developments in Georgia. Yet the most 
important advantage of Russia is that the Georgian government itself lacks clear vision 
on the development course; in particular, its fast economic modernization agenda is not 
fully consistent either with the EDPRP or the norms and standards that are to be 
negotiated within the ENAP (see sub-chapter 2.2.3). Some Georgian politicians and 
government officials keep trying to present Russian economic expansion as a new and 
harmless form of mutually useful cooperation. Past experience shows, however, that 
Russia has exerted economic pressure on Georgia in order to influence political 
decision-making. 
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But it is essential to convince Russia that the EU is not coming to the Black Sea with 
zero-sum intentions. In the meantime, however, the democratic deficit within the 
country, the unresolved conflicts and the weaknesses of the state institutions debilitate 
Georgia’s internal decision-making process and make it difficult for the EU to commit 
itself to Georgia. But the stakes are high in Georgia and it will take more courage and 
enthusiasm from both sides to set Europeanization in motion. Whether or not the EU 
will succeed in contributing to stability and economic development of Georgia will 
largely determine the overall success and credibility of the ENP process in the wider 
region. 
4 Towards Reconciling Agendas 
The ENP’s history is too brief to provide assortment of well-established precedents 
of true success stories worthy of emulation. Existing literature extensively argues that 
without a membership carrot, the ENP may not be able to assume the role of a ‘driver’ 
of democratic transformation. It is perceived that the promotion of the double objective 
of economic and political liberalism throughout the European neighbourhood in the 
absence of a mega-incentive, such as the EU membership, is a major challenge that 
the ENP idea faces. This is particularly true for Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova where 
the sense of European identity and the susceptibility to liberal-democratic values are 
stronger than elsewhere in the neighbourhood. At the same time, the specific situation 
in Georgia keeps the window of opportunity open, thus making a distinct case. The 
challenge in Georgia is not so much an absence of this incentive, but rather a 
harmonization of the ENP and Georgia’s mid-term development agenda.55 Increased 
EU-awareness will convince Georgian politicians that rather than busting heads with the 
EU for not offering the membership, it is wiser to engage the Union in a mutually agreed 
process leading to accomplishment of the priority objectives for the coming years56 (see 
sub-chapter 2.2.3). For its part, the EU would also welcome convergence of existing 
agendas, which means that the two sides will have to agree about the following: 
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• How far will Georgia go in advancing reforms towards meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria? 
• To what extent will the EU be committed to resolving Georgia’s outstanding 
security problems? 
These are the major questions at stake. At the same time, fulfilling mutually agreed 
obligations is a requirement of the deal. Although one might argue that proper utilization 
of the ENPI resources for other priority areas of the ENP Action Plan is of no less 
importance for Georgia, the restoration of territorial integrity overshadows other 
priorities of this government. Here, however, a fundamental question arises: What is the 
formula of this deal? What is the best strategy to achieve the mutually acceptable 
model of cooperation? Although coming to a compromise mode of cooperation is a two-
way process, it is still expected of the EU, as the stronger partner, to decide among the 
options. To be sure, there are three options: (a) low level commitment from both 
sides;57 (b) medium level commitment; (c) high level commitment. What follows is an 
overview and the evaluation of each of these policy options. 
4.1 Low Intensity Engagement 
The EU and Georgia agree on the ENP Action Plan, which lacks serious 
responsibilities and incentives from either side and, thus, is almost non-committal. 
Particularly, the EU retains a low profile in addressing conflicts in Georgia and keeps 
putting emphasis on post-conflict rehabilitation. The EUSR mandate remains limited 
and, hence, the mission proves futile. The EU tries to compensate passive political 
engagement by applying conditionality but the incentives, including relatively increased 
levels of aid, prove insufficient for convincing the government to foster reforms in the 
direction sought by the EU. As a result, Georgian government keeps advancing its own 
reform agenda, which does not necessarily prove effective. This agenda requires the 
implementation of the liberal option of a minimal State. The rationale behind this policy 
is to cut State regulatory activity as much as possible, as it is perceived to be the niche 
for corruption and excessive bureaucracy. 
The political situation vis-à-vis conflict zones deteriorates. Other international actors 
try to engage at the expense of EU’s decreased popularity. The ENP, like PCA, 
gradually marginalizes and eventually fails to deliver. The described scenario is 
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unfeasible for a number of political reasons and, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for 
policy. 
First, it is politically unacceptable for both Georgia and the EU. Although institutional 
integration into the EU is not among the country’s mid-term goals, in the long run, for 
Georgia the Union remains the most desirable destination. The EU’s attractiveness 
determines its strong gravity power and Georgia cannot afford the ‘luxury’ of indefinitely 
postponing, if totally abandoning, the prospect of membership. 
Second, failure of the ENP in Georgia undermines the EU’s objective to upgrade the 
state-building process in the country. The EU would like to see Georgia as an effective 
partner in addressing threats related with international crime, illegal migration, 
proliferation of WMD, etc. 
Third, the ENP’s failure in Georgia decreases its credibility across the 
neighbourhood. As one of the most motivated countries, Georgia has always been 
viewed as a test-case for the ENP. Its failure in Georgia would contribute to the 
spreading of disillusionment elsewhere in the region. 
4.2 Moderate Level Commitment 
The ENP Action Plan envisages a qualitatively higher level of partnership than that 
of the preceding period. In particular, the EU agrees to join the process of conflict 
resolution (as opposed to post-conflict rehabilitation in the previous option) by 
participating in the existing formats of negotiations, and upgrading the EUSR’s mandate 
to the level of Moldova (see Appendix). The Union supports the Peace Plan for 
settlement of conflict in South Ossetia and strongly backs the OSCE efforts. 
In areas such as visa facilitation, border monitoring, extending the EIB mandate to 
Georgia, etc. there is complete mutual understanding. In fact, the status of Georgia’s 
ENP Action Plan is equal to that of Moldova. 
For its part, the Georgian government’s economic policy increasingly complies with 
the ENP requirements. Georgia abandons the unilateral course of fast economic 
modernization. On the other hand, instead of wholesale adoption of the Copenhagen 
political criteria, as for EU accession candidates, Georgia’s action plan is intended to 
identify those elements in the existing reform agenda that have at least a partial fit with 
the Copenhagen criteria. As a result, adoption of the EU norms and standards in 
various sectors of economy has stimulated economic growth and improved the 
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investment climate. The process of PCA implementation proceeds gradually and leads 
to a higher level of approximation. 
This scenario is quite acceptable both politically and in terms of the administrative 
capacity of each side. The EU becomes a foreign and security policy actor in Georgia, a 
role it has never assumed before. This shift causes a major reconfiguration of 
stakeholders, adding dynamism to the conflict resolution in South Ossetia. Due to EU 
assistance, Georgia’s border protection and monitoring capacity is significantly 
upgraded. 
Gradual convergence on EU norms and standards allows Georgian government to 
best utilize its administrative capacity. The EU funded assistance programs, such as 
GEPLAC, helps fulfill the ENP Action Plan obligations. 
For its part, the EU too finds itself capable of properly administering the ENPI 
instrument and thus adequately responding to the needs of progressing reforms in 
Georgia. 
4.3 Accelerated Partnership 
The ENP Action Plan reflects a desire of the sides to elevate the relationship status 
to the next-to-membership level. Politically, the EU becomes Georgia’s main political 
patron and security guarantor. Resolution of the conflicts in Georgia is considered a 
primary criterion of ENP’s success. EU expresses readiness to take the lead in the 
process. At the same time, the EU, risking the deterioration of a key relationship, 
includes this issue in the bilateral dialogue with Russia. With this move the EU 
communicates to Russia the importance it attaches to the success of Georgian 
democracy. 
In addition, the EU agrees to meet the whole menu of Georgia’s expectations from 
the ENP process (see sub-chapter 2.4.5), including simplification of movement of 
labour, consultations on Free Trade Agreement, granting Georgia a status of Market 
Economy, etc. In fact, the content of the ENP Action Plan resembles that of Ukraine. 
For its part, Georgia adopts almost the whole acquis norms in the course of 
advancing reforms. As a matter of fact, the ENP is made a development policy anchor. 
The given scenario is unlikely because of the following: adoption of the EU’s acquis 
communautaire – its rule-book of laws and regulations, requires Herculean efforts. This 
body of laws and policies was designed for advanced, industrial economies. It was 
never intended as an instrument to guide economic, political or social development in 
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much poorer countries. The Single Market acquis is essentially concerned with market-
making, not reforming economies. The acquis is patchy, reflecting the EU’s own uneven 
development: it is highly detailed on market regulation, competition policy and the CAP, 
but very sketchy on governance issues. Proper implementation of EU rules requires 
complex and sophisticated institutional frameworks that are little developed in Georgia. 
Georgian economy and businesses are unprepared for closer relations with the EU. 
The Georgian business community and even the government lack enough knowledge 
about EU mechanisms, while the state does not defend domestic businesses from the 
pressure of rival companies and bureaucracy of the EU. As a result, Georgian 
corporations incur direct losses and can lose major markets for their goods and 
services. 
For Georgia, it is also important to recognize the opportunity costs of EU accession 
preparations. For countries like Georgia, which are unlikely to join the EU within the 
next ten to twenty years, it is far from optimal to expend enormous efforts in meeting 
EU standards and harmonizing with EU policies designed for established market 
economies—especially at the cost of more immediate policies designed to establish 
sustainable economic growth. EU policies are often cumbersome to administer and 
implement.58 
Politically, the EU is not in a position now to strain relations with Russia. Despite 
ever increasing divergence of values and attitudes towards different issues, such as 
human rights in Chechnya, the EU has to maintain balanced relations with Russia as 
energy security will remain a highest priority for decades to come. 
Additionally, an over-ambitious partnership like this is very costly to achieve and 
further maintain. The constantly deepening and—at the same time—high-speed 
reforms require ever-increasing aid funds that the EU may not necessarily be able to 
allocate for Georgia’s needs. 
Quite apparently, all sympathies go to the moderate level commitment scenario 
because it is: (a) politically feasible for both parties; (b) financially affordable for the EU, 
and (c) doable in terms of availability of administrative capacity of both the Georgian 
government and the Commission. To make this scenario one hundred percent realistic, 
the two sides need to expend some political will and agree on the formula. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Georgia’s drive towards Europe is determined by a set of factors, including history, 
religion, geography and politics. This is a primary reason why Georgians are a nation 
among the most motivated and receptive to European values in the wider region. Based 
on sustained popular support, Georgia’s European integration has become a top 
foreign policy priority. 
Several factors make Georgia an increasingly important country for the European 
Union. Primary interests include: making Georgia an effective partner in dealing with 
common unconventional threats (such as international terrorism, illegal migration, drug 
trafficking, proliferation of WMD, etc.), ensuring stable utilization of Georgia’s transit 
capacity for transporting Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe, and helping Georgia’s 
continuing democratic transformation become a successful role model. 
Effective participation in the ENP process is a shared interest between Georgia and 
the European Union. However, the absence of a common vision and diverging 
expectations are hindering a more effective partnership. For example, Georgia views 
the ENP as an avenue to the EU’s increased engagement in addressing outstanding 
security problems, whereas the EU expects that the ENP will upgrade Georgia to meet 
the Copenhagen criteria. 
The EU’s reluctance to offer a ‘membership perspective’ significantly weakens its 
leverage over Georgia’s development. It also undermines the position of pro-reform 
forces that advocate the ‘European’ model of development for Georgia. Also, the EU’s 
heavy reliance on Russia limits its options as a foreign policy and security actor to 
actively engage in Georgia. 
There are also several factors from the Georgian side that hinder the harmonization 
of the views and expectations mentioned above. One reason is a misperception of the 
fact that the ENP Action Plan acts as a symmetrical document. Another factor is 
Georgia’s inadequate institutional capabilities and lack of human resources that are 
necessary to fully adopt the EU acquis. But the main factor is the fact that Georgia has 
already set the priorities for the mid-term period (2005-2009), including peaceful 
settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia, and wishes to place the ENP process under 
this agenda. It is highly unlikely that under any circumstances Georgia will change its 
priorities. 
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Last but not least, Georgia’s keen interest to deliver in the mid-term period provides 
a unique opportunity for the EU compensate for the lack of a ‘membership perspective’ 
and contribute to the harmonization of agendas for the ENP. As a stronger partner, the 
EU has more maneuverability and power to adjust. 
5.1 Policy Recommendations 
What the European Union can do 
• EU should devise a mid-term policy vis-à-vis Georgia and use the ENP resources 
to pursue it. The primary goal of this policy must be helping accommodate 
Europeanization and fast economic modernization agendas. Basic pillars of this 
policy should focus on: (a) reinforcing the political reform process in Georgia; (b) 
conducting ENAP negotiations and ensuring its implementation, and (c) launching 
EU-Georgia dialogue aimed at raising EU awareness in Georgia. 
• The EU should clearly state that neither the Commission nor any other 
Community institution has excluded the eventual accession of any European 
country, nor would it be possible in view of current Treaty. Obviously the countries 
may never achieve full integration but to exclude them completely would 
contribute to destroying many of the positive reforms, which was advocated by a 
strong show of popular support in the streets in favour of democracy and justice.59 
• The EU has to spell out the criteria for achieving (or measuring) political 
conditions such as the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. The malleability of 
the political conditions may tempt political leaders to pretend that they are close to 
meet them. More detailed guidance would assist advocates of greater democracy 
and protection of human rights in highlighting what is wrong in the country. 
• Acknowledge Georgia’s European identity. Georgia’s European choice is largely 
determined by a Georgian proclivity for liberal-democratic values. In the absence 
of a ‘membership perspective’, this would serve as moral compensation. 
• Ensure coherence of policy. The Commission often sends mixed messages. For 
example, the DG for External Relations tries to encourage the EU’s neighbours by 
proposing trade concessions, but is often blocked by the directorates for 
agriculture and trade. The gap between a technocratic approach by the 
Commission and a political approach by the Council will also lead to incoherent 
policies.60 
• Assist Georgia in transferring knowledge from CEE countries. The EU should 
make full use of the expertise of state-building in the new member states through 
extending the ‘twinning’ programme to send experts to help Georgia. This is a 
capacity that was lacking prior to the 2004 enlargement. 
• Actively engage in conflict resolution process. For Georgia resolution of conflicts 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia constitutes an existential problem. Therefore, 
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increased support on the part of the EU in restoring territorial integrity would 
necessarily become a strong bargaining chip with the Georgian government in the 
absence of the membership card. In the case that the EU helps Georgia achieve 
one of its top priority mid-term objectives, such as peaceful restoration of territorial 
integrity (see sub-chapter 2.2.3), the chances for full-scale Europeanization will 
substantially increase. The EU could be of greater help by taking initiative to 
resolve the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts. So long as they persist, 
Georgia will spend too much on its army, its relations with Russia will be tense 
and a resumption of fighting will be likely. The EU could best help by working with 
the Russians to broker settlements for both regions. Conflicts may constitute a 
serious discontinuity in the application of the ENP and hinder its achievement. 
• Include Georgia’s political and security problems in the on-going dialogue with 
Russia. The instruments for good relations and cooperation that the EU and 
Russia have developed outside of the ENP framework creates a good basis for 
developing an agenda regarding political and security problems in Georgia. 
• Broaden EUSR’s mandate. The current mandate does not allow the EUSR to 
actively participate in the process of conflict settlement. The mandate is 
particularly focused on the post-conflict rehabilitation phase, rather than on 
conflict resolution.61 
• Dismiss the ‘Kosovo scarecrow’. The EU must distance itself from the position that 
the determination of the status of Kosovo, in case it secedes from Serbia and 
Montenegro, may be replicated elsewhere. Even more so, the EU must develop a 
well reasoned position on this. To say we don't recognise a linkage is not good 
enough. Otherwise, separatists will "scream about double standards" if the EU 
endorses independence in Kosovo but pushes reunification in Georgia.62 
• Coordinate policies with the U.S. in addressing conflicts. The success in achieving 
a peace settlement could provide the impetus for a concerted regional move 
towards democratization and better governance. For that to happen, the EU and 
the US should work together and use their combined leverage to get the 
conflicting parties, including Russia, to agree on a solution.63 
• Ensure coherence of the EU and the US policies in democratic transformation of 
Georgia. In order to secure the mass of perceived incentives sufficient to achieve 
‘transformative’ leverage, especially in the absence of the membership prospects, 
this coherence is absolutely necessary for the Union. It would add efficacy to 
conditionality with respect to political reforms and human rights. 
• Support Georgia’s bid for NATO membership. Given that EU membership is not 
on the cards in the near future for Georgia, NATO could play a crucial role in 
anchoring Georgia in the West, protecting it from any tendencies Russia may 
have to interfere. Therefore, the EU should support Georgia’s quest for NATO 
membership by encouraging the government to stick to peaceful ways of resolving 
the frozen conflicts. 
• Timely adopt the ENPI regulation and its implementation rules, providing inter alia 
for the smooth transition between the existing neighbourhood programmes (2005-
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2006) and the new cross-border cooperation programmes (2007-2013). Ensure 
that the financing is adequate to support the ENAP. 
• Apply positive conditionality by offering the maximum possible level of incentives 
similar to the cases of Moldova and Ukraine. The EU should ease some of its own 
restrictions on movements of goods and people, without delay. Greater flexibility 
on visas or an early offer of asymmetrical free trade access might offer a much 
greater chance of achieving many of the EU’s objectives. These include economic 
growth, higher incomes and more investment in Georgia. Only then can the EU 
begin to expect the sort of transformation hoped for under the ENP.64 
• When applying a conditionality mechanism, make conditions clear, consistent and 
credible. Otherwise, the Georgian government may wish to retain degrees of 
freedom for its own bilateral actions, hoping that EU policy can be generally 
supportive. 
• Apply differentiation to the maximum to make the Georgian government feel 
deservedly rewarded if reforms progress. 
• Apply competitive peer pressure method whereby the additional aid could be 
made available to countries getting the best evaluation marks on reforms (similar 
to the US Millennium Challenge Account). If the EU manages to ‘buy the critical 
mass of reform”,65 this would serve as an additional stimulus for the Georgian 
government to make the ENAP the centerpiece of the reform strategy. 
• Welcome and increase people-to-people contacts, including in the key areas of 
youth and education, through measures such as priority access to the Erasmus 
Mundus programme, reinforced participation in the Tempus programme, support 
to Georgia’s efforts to work towards convergence in higher education by 
participating in the Bologna process, considering the possibility of offering 
internships for young professionals, and continued support to independent 
media.66 
What Georgia can do 
• Adjust existing and future mid-term development policies to the ENAP. Ensure 
coherence of policy formulation and do not admit serious reform set-backs in the 
short- and medium-term. 
• Adopt realistic ENP Action Plan. During the ENAP negotiations focus attention on 
the key issues related to the institutional capacity-building. Dissociate the sector-
specific topics from priority political issues such as EU’s engagement in conflict 
resolution or border monitoring. The latter issues are beyond the EC’s mandate to 
negotiate. Therefore, a parallel process of consultations with the political bodies of 
the EU (Council of European Union and Europarliament) and individual member 
states is to be established. At the same time, unlike accession countries, Georgia 
is unable to copy everything from the EU. Although this does not mean to slow 
down the legal approximation process. Instead, this process should be 
conditioned by its impact on economic development, especially on the business 
climate. 
                                            
64
 See sub-chapter 2.3.3 
65
 See more on this in: European Neighbourhood Policy: enhancing prospects for reform in Mashreq 
countries. Final Report – Volume 2: Case studies and supplementary report, CEPS, April 2005, p. 18 
66
 This recommendation is copied from the General Affaits and External Relations Council’s conclusions 
on Ukraine, 28 February 2005, at: http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/site/page34190.html 
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• Develop a comprehensive Communication strategy. Eventual success of the ENP 
process depends on the public’s level of awareness about political, legal, 
economic and other aspects of the EU integration. This is important also because 
while some of the necessary reforms may not be overly popular, the government 
always should ensure that it can obtain as much public support as possible. 
• Start preparation for implementation of the ENAP as soon as possible. It is highly 
desirable that the Implementation Plan is signed before the end of 2006 so that 
the ENPI resources are immediately available for the agreed reforms. Preparation 
of the Implementation Plan should include monitoring arrangements. Make sure 
that the plan is realistic and specifies actions, sets deadlines and lists responsible 
institutions. Ensure improved accountability and transparency of the whole ENAP 
implementation process. 
• Focus on building the coodination capacities. Special attention is to be paid to the 
Office of the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration as well as 
EU integration units within the line ministries. 
• Ensure creation of pre-requisites of effective utilization of the ENP resources. The 
pre-requisites to take advantage of what the EU offers are a well-functioning state, 
a strongly motivated political class that wants to meet EU standards, and inflows 
of foreign direct investment. For a start, increase the efficiency of public 
administration. Skilled and motivated public service is crucial for effective 
utilization of the ENP resources. In this regard, timely adoption of a modern civil 
service code is critical. 
• Continue re-branding itself as a Black Sea state and therefore more European 
and less Caucasian.67 One of the purposes of this process, apart from developing 
dialogue in civil society, would be to design a tourism strategy aimed at attracting 
mainly European tourists. This would help to raise awareness among EU citizens 
about Georgia’s history and culture. 
• Make an argument about deploying EU’s border monitoring mission in Georgia. 
Refer to the recent EU decision to deploy monitors at the Rafah border between 
Gaza and Egypt and in Aceh in Indonesia. This spotlights the bloc’s growing 
global role and the increasing reach of European security and defense policy.68 
• Know your friends in the member states, the EU Parliament and the Commission. 
Increased lobbying capacity would ease advancement of Georgia’s agenda. 
Particularly, winning the favor of friends would allow Georgia to secure more 
resources as the ENPI comes into effect 
What is to be done jointly 
• Support the emergence of a core national executive. The ENP process should 
encourage the emergence of a strong, central team to manage and coordinate the 
rapprochement process, because the conditionality is based on implementing a 
vast array of legislation and procedural rules in order to comply with EU 
standards. 
                                            
67
 Most of the new member CEE countries have successfully redefined themselves prior to accession. 
E.g. the Baltic states were successfully redefined from post-Soviet into Central European states, 
Slovenia has dropped its Balkan identity to acquire Central European label, and Moldova has managed 
to join the South East Europe Stability Pact. 
68
 ‘EU ends year on upbeat note – but many challenges ahead’, Khaleej Times Online, 27 December, 
2005 
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• Provide more opportunities for the populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 
sharing the ownership of the ENAP. This would help the local populace broaden 
it’s perceptions of the EU as a welcoming and accessible place, which will 
possibly lead to a reconceptualization of their identities and prioritize 
Europeanization as a path for development. 
• Enhance civil society dialogue between the EU member states and Georgia in 
order to discuss concerns and perceptions in a frank and open manner. Public 
opinion in Georgia is strongly supportive of EU integration, but information on the 
history, the functioning, rules and policies of the European Union remains poor. 
This dialogue would also help to enhance public debate in Georgia on the ENP, 
which would lead to a deeper understanding and acceptance of EU values and 
standards. In addition to more general political issues, this dialogue is particularly 
important in certain areas of the EU acquis, such as the environment, food safety 
and consumer protection. An additional outcome of the dialogue will be further 
encouragement of pro-European forces both in politics and society. In the longer 
run, civil society dialogue will help advance socialization, a learning process that is 
directly related to extensive interaction between actors in partner states and the 
EU. 




Map of Enlarging Europe 
 
 
Source: The Economist, June 23, 2005 
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Appendix 2 
Glossary of Acronyms 
 
BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (pipeline) 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
DG Directorate General 
EDPRP Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program 
EIB European Investment Bank 
ENAP ENP Action Plan 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
ENPI European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument 
EUSR EU Special representative 
GEPLAC Georgian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center 
GUAM Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldovs 
IFI International Financial Institution 
KATB Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku (railway) 
MoA Ministry of Agriculture 
MoEdu Ministry of Education 
MoEn Ministry of Energy 
MoEnv Ministry of Environment 
MoLHSA Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs 
MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
NEGP North European Gas Pipeline 
NPLH National Plan for Law Harmonization 
PACE Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
SCGP South Caucasus Gas Pipeline 
SIPCA Support to Implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement 
TACIS Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia 
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UES United Energy Systems 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WTO World Trade Organization 
ARCHIL GEGESHIDZE: GEORGIA IN THE WIDER EUROPE CONTEXT 
 45 
Appendix 369 
Georgia, a developing country 
  Georgia China Estonia EMU India Romania 
GDPcurrent bln $ 2004 5,1 1649 10,8 9370 692 73,2 
GNI per capita current 2004 1040 1290 7010 27630 620 2920 
Population 2004 4521000 1296000000 1345000 307445536 1079721216 21857702 
Agric%VA 2003 20 15 4 2 22 12 
Inflation 2003 4 2 2  3 19 
Electricpower cons 2002 (kwh per 
cap) 
1158 987 3882 5912 380 1632 
Internet users/1000 (2003) 31 63 444 378 17 184 
Life expectancy at birth 2003 73 71 71 79 63 70 
Mortality rate infant/1000 2003 41 30 8 4 63 18 
School enrolment secondary (%) 
2002 
61  88 91  81 
 
Georgia and its neighbours 
  Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Russia Turkey 
GDPcurrent bln $ 2004 5,1 3,55 8,52 582,4 302 
GNI per capita current 2004 1040 1120 950 3410 3750 
Population 2004 4521000 3049658 8279540 142814208 71727048 
Agric%VA 2003 20 24 14 5 13 
Inflation 2003 4 5 4 14 23 
Electricpower cons 2002 (kwh percap) 1158 1113 1878 4291 1458 
Internet users/1000 (2003) 31 37 37(2002)  85 
Life expectancy at birth 2003 73 75 65(2000) 66 69 
Mortality rate infant/1000 2003 41 30 75 16 33 
School enrolment secondary (%) 2002 61 83 76   
 
Georgia and examples of transition income-driven economies 
  Georgia Albania Croatia Kyrgyz Rep Moldova 
GDPcurrent bln $ 2004 5,1 7,59 34,2 2,2 2,6 
GNI per capita current 2004 1040 2080 6590 400 710 
Population 2004 4521000 3187976 4507720 5099400 4217700 
Agric%VA 2003 20 25 8 39 23 
Trade balance 2004 (mln $ EBRD) - 720 - 1 675 - 8 227 - 182 - 788 
Inflation 2004 (%) 5.7 2.9 2.1 4.1 12.5 
Cum. FDI inflows per capita 1989-04 (EBRD) 371 450 2106 110 217 
External debt 2004 (mln $, EBRD)  2 039 1537 30 200 2044 10973 
External debt 2004 (% GDP) 40% 20% 88% 94% 76% 
                                            
69
 Charts are taken from the manuscript of the article – Samson, I., Zagainova, N., ‘The search of a 
development path: Challenges for Georgia’ to be published in: Georgian Economic Trends, Quarterly 
review, March 2006, No. 4, GEPLAC  
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Debt service 2004 (as % of export) 13.7 4.6 24.2 12.5 11 
Electricpower cons 2002 (kwh per cap) 1158 1390 2855 1269 909 
Internet users/1000 (2003) 31 10 232 38 80 
Life expectancy at birth 2003 73 74 74 65 67 
Mortality rate infant/1000 2003 41 18 6 59 26 
School enrolment secondary (%) 2002 61 77 87  69 
Remittances mln $ (2004) 300ml 
699      
(2001,IMF) 
727     
(2001, IMF) 
420 460 
Remittances as % GDP 
6% 
(WB) 
10%* 2% 20% 19% (WB) 
Remittances as % State Expenditures ≈ 37% ≈ 27% ≈ 5% ≈100% ≈ 72% 
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Appendix 4 
The comparative analysis of the EUSR mandates for Moldova and Georgia70 
EUSR Mandate for Moldova EUSR Mandate for Georgia 
(1) On June 14 2004 the Council states 
the willingness of the European Union to 
play more active role in Moldova 
(1) The Council has stated its 
willingness to play a more active political 
role in the Soutn Caucasus (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia) 
Objectives: 
The very first objective (art. 2,1, (a)) 
reads: 
“…to contribute to a peaceful 
settlement of the Transnistria conflict 
and to the implementation of such a 
settlement on the basis of a viable 
solution, respecting the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the 
Republic of moldova within its 
internationally recognised borders”. 
Objectives: 
The very first objective (art. 2,1, (a)) 
reads: 
“…to assist Armenia, Azerbaijan and 




No mention of the respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Georgia 
Emphasis on conflict resolution 
• Art. 2,1, (a), - (contribute to a 
peaceful settlement of Transnistria 
conflict): 
• Art. 3,1 (a), - (strengthen the EU 
contribution to the resolution of the 
Transnistria conflict); 
• Art.3 (b) (“assist in the preparation, 
as appropriate, of EU contributions to 
the implementation of an eventual 
conflict settlement”); 
• Art.3, (d) (“assist in the further 
development of the EU’s policy 
towards the Republic of Moldova and 
the region, inparticular regarding 
conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution”); 
• Art.3 (d) ”follow political 
developments in Transnistrian 
region”) 
Emphasis on conflict prevention 
• Art. 2 (b) (“prevent conflicts in the 
region); 
• Art. 3 (c) (“contribute to the 
prevention of conflicts”); 
• Art. 3 (d) (“assist on conflict 
resolution, in particular to enable the 
EU better to support UN, Group of 
Friends, OSCE, etc.”) 
Comment: 
• No mention of the respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Georgia 
• EUSR mandate focuses on assisting 
other organization’s activities rather 
than guiding the EU initiated process 
 
                                            
70
 The document is prepared by the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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Appendix 5 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 21 February 2006 
 
Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on recent developments in Georgia -South Ossetia 
 
The European Union refers to the Resolution of the Georgian Parliament of 15 February 2006 on 
South Ossetia, the peace process and the performance of the peacekeeping force under Russian 
command. 
The European Union reiterates its support for a peaceful resolution of the territorial conflicts in 
Georgia, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally 
recognised borders. 
The European Union urges all parties concerned to refrain from unilateral action and to find a 
constructive approach in order to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping in South Ossetia. 
The European Union stresses the need for a constructive exchange of views between interested 
international actors in the region, including EU and OSCE Member States, on possible additional efforts 
contributing to peaceful settlement mechanisms in South Ossetia. 
The European Union points to the need to increase the effectiveness of the negotiating mechanisms. 
The work of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) should be measured by the rapid implementation of all 
outstanding agreements previously reached and in particular by the start of demilitarisation. 
The European Union deeply regrets the cancellation of the high-level JCC meeting as scheduled to 
take place in Vienna (20-21 February), and urges the parties to resume dialogue as soon as possible. 
The European Union recalls its support for the initiatives taken towards peaceful resolution of the 
conflict and, following decisions made at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Ljubljana in December 2005, its 
belief that the Peace Plan built upon the initiatives of the President of Georgia presented at the 59th 
UNGA will serve as a basis for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
The European Union reiterates that it stands ready to contribute actively, and in every relevant forum, 
to accelerating the process of demilitarisation and of conflict resolution overall, which has been stalled for 
too long. 
The European Union underlines the value of the Georgian leadership's commitment to political and 
economic reforms, based on respect for democratic values, rule of law and human rights, including rights 
of ethnic minorities. 
The Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate Countries, Croatia* and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and 
potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and the EFTA countries 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and 
the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration. 
 
*Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process. 
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Appendix 6 
Tbilisi, February 15 
 
Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on the Current Situation in the Former South 
Ossetian Autonomous District and the Ongoing of the Peacekeeping Process 
 
In accordance with paragraph 2 of the resolution No 1927-II of the Parliament of Georgia on the 
"Current Situation in the Conflict Regions on the Territory of Georgia and Ongoing Peace Operations”, 
adopted on 11 October 2005, the Parliament of Georgia heard the report of the Government of Georgia 
on the current situation in the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia and fulfillment of 
commitments undertaken by the Peace-keeping forces dislocated there. 
Proceeding from the aforementioned report, the Parliament of Georgia resolves: 
1. To assess the activity and fulfillment of the obligations within the current mandate of the peace-
keeping forces dislocated in the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia as extremely negative, and 
actions of the Russian Federation as permanent efforts aimed at annexation of this region of Georgia. 
2. To entrust the government of Georgia with the task of enforcing the provisions laid down in 
paragraphs 4 and 6 of the resolution # 1927-IIs of the Parliament of Georgia on the "Current Situation in 
the Conflict Regions on the Territory of Georgia and Ongoing Peace Operations” adopted on 11 October 
2005, including the Sochi Agreement of 24 June 1992, and also to take steps aimed at replacing the 
peace-keeping forces of the Russian Federation dislocated in the Former Autonomous District of South 
Ossetia with an effective international peace-keeping operation. 
3. In order to avoid further inspired destabilization of the situation on the territory of former 
Autonomous District of South Ossetia, to put an end to the massive violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and to start a genuine peace process, to entrust the government of Georgia with 
the task of intensifying the work with international organizations and partner States aimed at working out 
a new format for peace process. 
4. In order to secure a comprehensive, peaceful and political settlement of the conflict on the territory 
of former Autonomous District of South Ossetia, to entrust the Government of Georgia with the task of 
intensifying the work with international organizations and partner States aimed at full implementation of 
peace plan endorsed by the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE member states. 
5. To entrust the Government of Georgia with the task of providing the existing documents to 
international organizations, the Russian Federation and the partner states with regard on the current 
situation in the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia and the failure of the peace-keeping forces 
to fulfill their commitments. 
 
Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia: Nino Burjanadze 
